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I. INTRODUCTION

This Article will first briefly review the events leading up to the Intel
decision.! It will then explain the procedure of making a § 1782 request
and address the Intel decision's overall impact on this process. The
discussion will primarily focus on the Court's four major holdings: (1) §
1782 assistance is not limited to "pending" or "imminent" adjudicative
proceedings; (2) the European Commission (EC) acts as a "foreign

* Associate, Quinn Emanuel Urquhart Oliver & Hedges LLP.
1. Intel v. AMD, 124 S. Ct. 2466 (2004).
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tribunal;" (3) as a complainant in the EC, Advanced Micro Devices
(AMD) is an "interested person;" and (4) § 1782 does not contain a foreign
discoverability requirement.2 In addition to discussing the Court's rulings,
this Article will also analyze whether the decision is consistent with
congressional intent and prior case law. Finally, this Article will examine
the district court's decision on remand, specifically focusing on whether
it followed the U.S. Supreme Court's guidelines when it exercised its
discretionary authority.
11. BRIEF OVERVIEW OF INTEL V. AMD
Intel arose when AMD filed a complaint with the Directorate General
for Competition (DG-Competition) of the EC in October 2000.' AMD
alleged that archrival Intel violated EC competition laws by monopolizing
the worldwide market for Windows-capable microprocessors. 4 In support
of its case, AMD suggested that the DG-Competition seek discovery of
some 600,000 pages of documents that Intel produced in the United States
during a private antitrust litigation in Alabama.5 After DG-Competition
openly declined its recommendation, AMD independently attempted to
secure the documents.6 AMD filed a § 1782 request in the U.S. District
Court for the Northern District of California seeking the evidence obtained
in the Alabama litigation.7 The district court rejected AMD's request, but
the Ninth Circuit later reversed.' Intel subsequently petitioned the U.S.
Supreme Court to review the decision.9

2. 28 U.S.C. § 1782 (2005) (effective Feb. 10, 1996).
3. Intel, 124 S. Ct. at 2474. Complaints are filed with the DG-Competition, who conducts
a preliminary investigation that results in a written decision on whether to further pursue the
complaint. Although the party filing the complaint may offer its own evidence and
recommendations, the DG-Competition has complete discretion on whether to prosecute. Ifthe DGCompetition decides to proceed with the complaint, it must make a recommendation to the EC. The
EC will then evaluate the complaint and the DG-Competition's findings, and either issue a decision
for infringement and impose penalties or dismiss the complaint entirely. Lawrence W. Newman &
David Zaslowsky, The Supreme Court on International Discovery, N.Y. L.J., July 29, 2004, at 3.
4. Intel, 124 S. Ct. at 2475.
5. AMD requested the district court to unseal certain documents involved in Intel's lawsuit
with Intergraph. Id.; see also Intergraph Corp. v. Intel Corp., 3 F. Supp. 2d 1255 (N.D. Ala. 1998),
vacated by 195 F.3d 1346 (1999), remanded to 88 F. Supp. 2d 1288 (N.D. Ala. 2000), aff'd, 253
F.3d 695 (2001).
6. Intel, 124 S. Ct. at 2475.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 2476.
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The U.S. Supreme Court remanded the case to the district court.10 In its
7-1 decision, the Court stressed the district court's enormous discretion
and articulated several guidelines for the lower court to follow when
making its determination." Among its recommendations include three
significant findings that resolve the circuit courts' previously conflicting
policies: (1) non-litigants can invoke § 1782 assistance, (2) the foreign
proceeding only needs to be within reasonable contemplation, and (3) the
desired evidence is not required to be discoverable in the foreign
jurisdiction. 2 With these guidelines, the U.S. Supreme Court remanded
Intel for the district court to determine what documents,
if any, will be
3
released for the DG-Competition's investigation.

III. INTEL'S OVERALL IMPACT ON §

1782's

STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS

Section 1782 reflects congressional effort to provide and foster foreign
discovery assistance to tribunals throughout the world. 4 The statute was
created with two goals in mind: to provide efficient means of discovery
assistance to participants in international proceedings and to encourage
foreign countries by example to provide similar services to U.S. courts. 5
Courts have traditionally focused on promoting these two aims when
adjudicating § 1782 applications. 6 Section 1782 generally provides a far
less cumbersome procedure for obtaining discovery assistance than the
other available foreign tools.'" For this reason, foreign parties seeking
10. Id. at 2484.
11. Intel, 124 S. Ct. at 2484. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsberg authored the majority opinion.
Justice Stephen Breyer provided the dissenting opinion, while Justice Sandra Day O'Conner did
not take part in the case. Id at 2472.
12. See Gregory P. Joseph, InternationalDiscovery, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 2, 2004, at 77.
13. Id. at 2484.
14. Intel v. AMD, 124 S. Ct. at 2473.
15. In re Schmitz, 259 F. Supp. 2d 294, 296 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
16. Peter Metis, InternationalJudicialAssistance:
Does 28 US.C. 1782 ContainanImplicit
DiscoverabilityRequirement?, 18 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 332, 338 & 347 (1994).
17. Foreign parties may also pursue U.S. discovery assistance through treaties. The Hague
Evidence Convention and the treaties on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters are among
the treaties that contain discovery assistance clauses. Foreign parties generally have an easier time
seeking discovery under § 1782 than under these treaties because § 1782 does not require letter
rogatories, treaty provisions, or U.S. governmental assistance. Despite the apparent advantages of
the statute, parties have sometimes found it to be an unattractive option in practice because it
provides the district court with too much discretion. James Bernard & Marvin G. Pickholz, Civil
DisclosureandFreezingOrders:RecoveringPropertyfromOverseas, 12 DIcK. J. INT'LL.479,482
(1995). Because of the great complexity, this Article will not discuss the relationship between §
1782 and treaties.
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discovery in the United States for proceedings abroad typically take
advantage of this statute.'"
In order to qualify for discovery assistance under § 1782, a request
must always meet the following three statutory requirements: (1) the
person from whom discovery is sought resides or is found in the district
court's jurisdiction, (2) the discovery is for use in a proceeding before a
foreign tribunal, and (3) the application is made by a foreign or
international tribunal or an interested person.' 9 If these requirements are
met, a district court is authorized, but not required, to approve a § 1782
request for discovery assistance. 20 As will be described in detail later,
although Intel did not change the analysis of the first statutory condition,
it significantly broadened the interpretation of the second and third
requirements.2 '
A. Personfrom Whom Discovery is Sought Resides or is Foundin the
District Court'sJurisdiction
The first requirement has generally been an easy determination to
make.22 A "person" includes any individual, corporation, or company that
resides or is based in the district court's jurisdiction.23 The "person"
classification clearly includes both parties and nonparties to the foreign
proceeding. 24 Furthermore, individuals found temporarily in the district are
also subject to discovery under § 1782. For example, a foreign national,
who is simply visiting the United States, can be ordered to produce
discovery pursuant to § 1782.5

18. For this reason, foreign parties seeking discovery in the United States for proceedings
abroad should take advantage of this liberal statute. Hans Smit, American Assistance to Litigation
in Foreign and International Tribunals: Section 1782 of Title 28 of the U.S.C. Revisited, 25

SYRACUSE J. INT'LL. & COM. 1, 19 (1998).
19. 28 U.S.C. § 1782 (2005) (effective Feb. 10, 1996).
20. Intel v. AMD, 124 S. Ct. 2466, 2482 (2004).
21. See infra text accompanying notes 26-121.
22. See Hans Snit, American Assistance to Litigation in Foreign and International
Tribunals: Section 1782 of Title 28 of the US.C. Revisited,25 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 1,9-

10 (1998); see generally infra text accompanying notes 26-121.
23. See also 28 U.S.C. § 1782 (2005) (effective Feb. 10, 1996).
24. See In re Ishihara Chem. Co., 121 F. Supp. 2d 209, 218 (E.D.N.Y 2000).
25. See In re Edelman, 295 F.3d 171, 177 (2d Cir. 2002).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol18/iss1/5

4

Patel: International Judicial Assistance: An Analysis of Intel v. AMD an

2006] INTERN-ATIONAL JUDIC L4 ASSTANCE: ANANALMSIS OF INTEL v. AMD AND InS AFFECT ON § 1782 305

B. Discovery is for Use in a ProceedingBefore a Foreign Tribunal
Prior to the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling in Intel, courts had different
interpretations of the second statutory requirement.26 Some courts required
that the adjudicative proceeding be pending or imminent, while other
courts refused to impose such a requirement. 2 Likewise, several courts
narrowly construed what proceedings qualified as foreign tribunals, while
other courts used a much broader interpretation. 28 The U.S. Supreme Court
helped clarify some of these ambiguities in its Intel opinion.29
Intel argued that because the complaint was still in the investigation
phase, there was no pending or imminent adjudicative proceeding. The
Court, however, rejected Intel's argument, holding that § 1782 did not
require that a foreign proceeding be pending or imminent.3 It based its
decision on two grounds. First, there was no mention of pending or
imminent in the text of the statute.32 Second, legislative history clearly
proves that Congress intended to have § 1782 discovery assistance
available in foreign criminal, civil, and administrative proceedings and
investigations.33 Accordingly, the Court held that a valid § 1782 request
only requires that the dispositive ruling be within a reasonable
contemplation.'
The U.S. Supreme Court made the correct ruling. 35 Both congressional
intent and the guiding principles behind § 1782 clearly support the Court's
decision to reject the requirement that the foreign proceeding be pending
or imminent.36 Prior to the 1964 amendment of the statute, § 1782
authorized discovery only for judicial proceedings "pending in any court
' The 1964 revision, however, deleted the word
in a foreign country."37
"pending" and instead inserted language requiring only that the evidence
be "for use" in a proceeding.38

26. Intel, 124 S. Ct. at 2466.
27. See generally id.
28. Id. at 2479.
29. Id. at 2474, 2479-80.
30. Id. at 2479.
31. Intel, 124 S. Ct. at2479.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 2480.
34. Id.
35. 28 U.S.C. § 1782 (1963), amended by Pub. L. 88-619.
36. Id.
37. Brief B: Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Affirmance, at 17; 28
U.S.C. 1782 (1958).
38. Brief for Respondent, 2004 WL 29784, at 8.
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Despite this clear alteration, some courts, such as the Second Circuit,
refused to enforce the change because they were unsure whether the
modification was intentional or inadvertent.39 However, this analysis is
incorrect for several reasons. First, the face of the amended 1964 statute
does not make any specific textual reference that the proceeding must be
pending.40 If Congress wanted the pending requirement to remain intact,
it would have simply left that portion of the statute untouched. On the
contrary, the Congress chose to delete it. Second, there is no clear
legislative evidence, as AMD suggested, that the deletion was accidental
or unintentional.4 In fact, when the legislature makes such a material
change, it is presumed that the deletion signifies an intent to modify the
meaning of the statute.42 Commentary by Hans Smit, the leading drafter of
the 1964 revision, further strengthens this presumption.43 Smit, whom the
Second Circuit itself calls the "chief architect" of the modem § 1782,"
contemporaneously authored an article that explained the rationale behind
the 1964 amendment in significant detail.45 In his commentary, Smit
clarified:
In the new version, the word "pending" was eliminated to facilitate
the gathering of evidence prior to the institution of litigation abroad.
... The only limitation on the nature of the evidence is that it must
be sought for use in a proceeding in a foreign or international
tribunal. It is not necessary, however, for the proceeding to be
pending at the time the evidence is sought, but only that the
evidence is eventually to be used in such a proceeding.46

39. In re Request for Int'l Judicial Assistance for the Federative Republic of Brazil, 936 F.
2d 702, 706 (2d Cir. 1991).
40. See 28 U.S.C. 1782; see also Intel v. AMD, 124 S. Ct. 2466,2479 (2004).
41. Brief for Respondent at 37, Intel, 124 S. Ct. at 2466.
42. See In re Request for Assistance from Ministry of Legal Affairs of Trin. & Tobago, 848
F.2d 1151, 1154 (1Ith Cir. 1988).
43. Smit has been described as the "dominant drafter" and "chief architect" of the modem
§ 1782. He was the director of the Columbia Law School Project on International Procedure and
also a key Reporter to Congress's Commission on International Rules of Judicial Procedure. The
Commission was specifically created to recommend revisions to U.S. laws that improve existing
practices of foreign discovery assistance. Euromepa S.A. v. R. Esmerian, 51 F.3d 1095, 1099 (2d
1995) (quoting Hans Smit, Recent Developments in International Litigation, 35 S. TEX. L.J. 215,
235 (1994)); Respondent's Brief at 4, Intel, 124 S. Ct. at 2466 (No. 02-572).
44. Brief for Respondent, 2004 WL 297864, at 4.
45. See generally Hans Smit, International Litigation Under the United States Code, 65
COLUM. L. REV. 1015 (1965).
46. Id. at 1026-27 n.72.
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Therefore, according to Smit, Congress's decision to delete the pending
requirement was anything but inadvertent. 7 Rather, Congress made the

change to offer U.S. discovery assistance in those foreign proceedings that
are not yet pending, but that will be initiated in the future.48
The 1964 Senate Report,49 which accompanied the statutory revisions,
further supports the argument that the pending requirement was purposely
deleted.5 ° For example, the report confirms Congress's intention to open
the doors to § 1782 assistance for cases that are only in the pre-litigation
phase." The report specifically states that discovery is authorized "whether
the foreign or international proceeding or investigation is of a criminal,
civil administrative, or other nature."52 In 1996, through another revision,
Congress again reaffirmed its intent to allow § 1782 assistance during the
pre-litigation phase.53 The revision explicitly stated that a district court
could order discovery pursuant to § 1782 for use in a proceeding in a
foreign tribunal, "including criminal investigations conducted before
formal accusations."' This language confirms prior interpretation that §
1782 permits the collection of evidence during the investigation stages of
a proceeding. Therefore, as both the legislative history and the Smit's
commentary indicate, Congress intentionally deleted the pending
requirement from the text of the statute, in order for courts to grant prelitigation discovery assistance to foreign parties and tribunals.55
The Court's decision not to apply a pending requirement also makes
sense on a practical level. As previously mentioned, § 1782 was created to
provide efficient means of discovery assistance to participants in
international proceedings.5 6 If § 1782 is strictly limited to pending cases,
this goal cannot be fully achieved. The Intel case illustrates the problems
created by enforcing such a requirement.5 The EC allows interested

47. See id.
48. S. REP. No. 88-1580 (1964), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3789.
49. Id. at 9.
50. Id.
51. See generally id.
52. Id.
53. Nat'l Defense Authorization Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-106, § 1342, 110 Stat. 186,
486 (2005) (effective Feb. 10, 1996).
54. 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) (2005) (effective Feb. 10, 1996).
55. S. REP. No. 88-1580, at 9; Hans Smit, InternationalLitigation Under the United States
Code, 65 COLUM. L. REv. 1015 (1965); Hans Smit, Recent Developments in International
Litigation, 35 S. TEX. L. REv. 215 (1994).
56. In re Schmitz, 259 F. Supp. 2d 294, 296 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
57. Intel v. AMD, 124 S. Ct. 2466, 2477 (2004).
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parties, such as AMD, to provide evidence in support of its complaint.58 If
the claims are compelling, the EC's investigating branch, the DGCompetition, can further litigate the matter.59 If, instead, the DGCompetition decides to dismiss the complaint, the complainant has the
right to appeal.' However, judicial review of the DG-Competition's
decision is limited to the record compiled by the DG-Competition, the
complainant, and the target up to the time of the appellate hearing.6 The
appellate court can only consider whatever evidence these parties have
access to and can present during this pre-litigation phase. 2 In other words,
by the time the pending requirement is met, it would be too late for the
complainant to submit evidence for the reviewing court to consider in its
hearing.63 Therefore, the pending requirement would prevent parties from
having their claims fairly adjudicated. This scenario clearly violates §
1782's fundamental goal of providing efficient means of discovery
assistance to participants in international proceedings.
Proponents ofthe pending requirement argue that such an interpretation
will open the doors to burdensome fishing expeditions. If no immediate
time constraint is enforced, they argue, parties with no realistic plans of
pursuing litigation will misuse § 1782 as a scare tactic to force opposing
parties to settle. These arguments, however, have little merit. Such
reasoning ignores the text of the statute, which states that a court may
order the production of evidence "for use" in a foreign proceeding." The
phrase "for use" should inherently weed out the majority of frivolous
requests. After all, the U.S. Supreme Court interpreted the "for use"
language as a requirement for the requesting party to prove that a
dispositive ruling "be within reasonable contemplation."'65 Likewise,
district courts that have applied this reasonableness standard have focused
on evidence that establishes that a foreign proceeding is likely to occur.'
In other words, requests will not be granted on hollow assertions that a
judicial proceeding will follow. Therefore, the fear that the U.S. Supreme
Court opened the doors to countless fishing expeditions is greatly
exaggerated.
58. Newman & Zaslowsky, supra note 3, at 3.
59. Id.

60. Id.
61. Brief for Respondent at 37, Intel v. AMD, 124 S. Ct. 2466 (2004) (No. 02-572).
62. Brief for Respondent at 14-15, Intel, 124 S. Ct. at 2466.
63. Id.
64. 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) (2005) (effective Feb. 10, 1996).
65. Intel, 124 S. Ct. at 2480.
66. See In re Request for Assistance from Ministry of Legal Affairs of Trin. & Tobago, 848
F.2d 1151, 1154 (1lth Cir. 1988).
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According to the second statutory element, the requested discovery
must be used in a foreign tribunal. Prior to the 1964 amendment, § 1782
provided assistance only to those cases adjudicated in a foreign court.67
The amendment, however, expanded § 1782 to permit discovery for use
in any "foreign or international tribunal." ' The Senate Report,
accompanying the change, stated the amendment "clarifies and liberalizes
existing U.S. procedures" 69 explaining:
The word "tribunal" is used to make it clear that assistance is not
confined to proceedings before conventional courts. For example,
it is intended that the courts have discretion to grant assistance
when proceedings are pending before investigating magistrates in
foreign countries. In view of the constant growth of administrative
and quasi-judicial proceedings all over the world, the necessity for
obtaining evidence in the United States may be as impelling in
proceedings before a foreign administrative tribunal or quasijudicial agency as in proceedings before a conventional foreign
court. Subsection (a) therefore provides the possibility of U.S.
judicial assistance in connection with all such proceedings." °
Therefore, the 1964 amendment clearly expanded § 1782's scope. 7' As the
Senate Report states, district courts now have discretion to grant discovery
for use in administrative hearings and quasi-judicial proceedings.72 In
1996, Congress further clarified its intent through another amendment.
This revision added that a district court could grant discovery for use in a
proceeding in a foreign tribunal "including criminal investigations
conducted before formal accusation[s]."' 3 This added language confirms
prior authority that district courts even have discretion to grant § 1782
discovery for use in pre-litigation proceedings.
Under the current, revised statute, the U.S. Supreme Court was correct
in ruling that the EC qualifies as a foreign or international tribunal. In fact,
Smit specifically identified the EC as the type of tribunal for which the

67. Bernard & Pickholz, supra note 17, at 486.
68. 28 U.S.C. § 1782 (2005) (effective Feb. 10, 1996).
69. S. REP. No. 88-1580 (1964), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3782, 3788.
70. Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
71. See id.
72. Smit also reiterated the Senate Report's findings. In his commentary, Smit stated that the
term "tribunal" includes both investigating magistrates and administrative tribunals. Smit, supra
note 45, at 1026 n.71.
73. 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) (2005) (effective Feb. 10, 1996).
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newly liberalized discovery assistance was intended.74 "New Section 1782
...permits the rendition of proper aid in proceedings before the EEC
[European Economic Community] Commission in which the Commission
exercises quasi-judicial powers . . ."' Hence, in this particular instance,
the drafter's intent clearly supports the Court's decision.
In addition to legislative intent, the Court's ruling is also supported by
policy reasons linked to the structure of the EC's decision-making process.
All complaints filed with the EC are first given to its DG-Competition
branch.76 The DG-Competition conducts a preliminary investigation into
the matter." It then submits a comprehensive report to the EC with a final
suggestion on whether to further pursue the issue.7" If the DG-Competition
recommends pursuing the matter, the EC will review the DGCompetition's investigation findings and issue a decision.79
As stated above, the legislature recognizes that § 1782 can apply to
investigative proceedings, such as the one conducted by the DGCompetition. Furthermore, the EC itself has the authority to adjudicate
complaints that allege anti-competitive conduct."0 Similar to an actual
court, in order to make a decision, the EC must first make rulings on
essential questions of fact and law. If the EC ultimately finds instances of
infringement, it can impose appropriate liabilities and penalties. 8' Because
the EC, like American criminal courts, engages in basic adjudicative
functions, it properly falls within the reach of § 1782.
Even if the EC is not a tribunal, the matter will eventually lead to a
proceeding in a tribunal. If either the DG-Competition or the EC dismisses
the complaint, the complainant has the right to seek an appeal by the
European Court of First Instance and the Court of Justice, both of which
classify under § 1782 as foreign courts.82 Likewise, the defense also has
the right to appeal an unfavorable decision. 3 In other words, no matter
what action the EC takes, its final decision is clearly subject to judicial
review by a traditional court. Therefore, even if the district court denies the

74. Smit, supra note 45, at 1027 n.73.

75. Id.
76. Newman & Zaslowsky, supra note 3, at 3.
77. Id.
78. Id.

79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Newman & Zaslowsky, supra note 3, at 3.
82. See Intel v. AMD, 124 S. Ct. 2466,2479 (2004); see also Newman & Zaslowsky, supra
note 3, at 3.
83. See Intel v. AMD, 124 S. Ct. 2466, 2479 (2004); see also Newman & Zaslowsky, supra
note 3, at 3.
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complainant's request for discovery during the EC proceeding, it must
permit the request for use in the appellate proceedings.
Taking into account the Court's decision not to enforce a foreign
discoverability requirement, practical reasons favor granting the request
now rather than forcing the complainant to file another § 1782 request in
preparation for appellate hearings." Most importantly, the district court
will save a substantial amount of time and money if it grants the
complainant's current § 1782 request. If not, the complainant will file a
new application for the appellate hearing. Because the European Court of
First Instance and the Court of Justice are clearly traditional tribunals, this
appellate stage request will be granted. Therefore, if a court will inevitably
grant the same request in the later stages of the foreign litigation, then it
is a waste of resources for a court to deny the initial § 1782 application. It
is also important to emphasize that § 1782 only requires that the foreign
tribunal proceeding be within reasonable contemplation. 5 The proceeding
does not have to be pending or imminent. Because the parties can appeal
any adverse EC decision, the appellate hearing is within reasonable
contemplation. For these reasons, the district court cannot deny AMD's §
1782 request on the sole basis that it does not satisfy the foreign tribunal
requirement.
C. Application Made by a Foreignor InternationalTribunalor an
InterestedPerson
Section 1782's third statutory requirement demands that the applicant
be a foreign or international tribunal or an "interested person."' Courts
historically have interpreted "interested person" to encompass a wide
range of applicants. Although the statute covers foreign litigants and
sovereigns, the meaning of "interested person" extends well beyond these

84. Because § 1782 does not have a foreign discoverability requirement, the district court
cannot reject a § 1782 request on the basis that the European appellate court would not consider
evidence outside of the EC's investigation.
85. See Intel, 124 S.Ct. at 2480; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) (2005) (effective Feb. 10,

1996).
86. 28 U.S.C. § 1782 (a) (2005) (effective Feb. 10, 1996). The third requirement has
generally been fulfilled in three different ways. First, the traditional process of submitting a letter
rogatory can be used. The burdensome process of filing a letter rogatory, however, makes this a less
appealing and a less used option. Second, a traditional tribunal, such as a foreign court, can make
a direct discovery request. Third, and the most controversial option, "any interested person" may
file a § 1782 request to the appropriate U.S. district court. 28 U.S.C. § 1782 (2005) (effective Feb.
10, 1996). No letter rogatory, treaty provision, or permission from a foreign tribunal is required for
"any interested person" to take advantage of this rule. Bernard & Pickholz, supra note 17, at 479.
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parties. Eligible applicants have included: foreign litigants,87 the Tokyo
district attorney,88 the Minister of Legal Affairs in Trinidad and Tobago,8 9
and an agent for the court-appointed trustee of a foreign debtor about to
enter into bankruptcy proceedings.9"
The U.S. Supreme Court in Intel similarly followed the trend towards
a broad interpretation of an interested person. It ruled that the category of
interested persons, who qualified for § 1782 assistance, was broader than
litigants, foreign sovereigns, and agents of foreign sovereigns. 9' For
example, even though AMD was not a litigant in the foreign proceeding,
the Court held that AMD qualified as an interested person because it
possessed "a reasonable interest in obtaining [§ 1782] assistance."92 As the
complainant, AMD played a significant role in the proceeding by
triggering the EC investigation.93 In addition, AMD had the right to submit
evidence for consideration by the DG-Competition, as well as the right to
appeal the DG-Competition's ultimate decision."4 Given these active
participatory roles, the Court held that AMD qualified as an interested
person with a reasonable interest in obtaining § 1782 discovery assistance.
For the aforementioned reasons, the U.S. Supreme Court made the
correct decision by classifying AMD as an interested party in the EC
proceeding. However, the Court failed to elaborate on the general
requirements necessary to qualify as an interested person under § 1782.
The particular meaning of this expression is unclear on the face of the
statute. Nor is there much decisional law discussing the exact definition of
an interested person in other contexts.95 Despite the U.S. Supreme Court's
failure to provide further clarification on this term, legislative history and
other federal statutes help shed light on the correct definition of § 1782's
interested person. Based on these guiding references, an interested person
is a party who has a legal interest in the matter at hand and who also plays
an actual role in the proceeding.

87. See, e.g., In re Merck & Co., Inc., 197 F.R.D. 267 (M.D.N.C. 2000).
88. See, e.g., In re Letters Rogatory from the Tokyo Dist. Prosecutor's Office, 16 F.3d 1016,

1019 (9th Cir. 1994).
89. See, e.g., In re Request for Assistance from Ministry of Legal Affairs ofTrin. & Tobago,
848 F.2d 1151, 1155 (1lth Cir. 1988).
90. See, e.g., Lancaster Factoring Co. v. Mangone, 90 F.3d 38,42 (2d Cir. 1996).
91. See Intel v. AMD, 124 S. Ct. 2466, 2478 (2004).
92. Id (quoting Smit, supra note 45, at 1027).
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Portland Audubon Soc'y v. Endangered Species Comm., 984 F.2d 1534, 1544 (9th Cir.
1993).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol18/iss1/5

12

Patel: International Judicial Assistance: An Analysis of Intel v. AMD an

2006] INTERNATIONAL JUDICAL ASSISTANCE: ANANALYSIS OF INTEL v. AMD AND TS AFFECTON§ 1782

313

To better understand the derivation of the above definition, it is
important to recognize that when making the determination of whether an
individual is an interested person, there are two conflicting policies at
play-the general Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and § 1782's
expansive text. Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, discovery is
generally available only to parties that file a complaint." Thus, the party
has to be a litigant in the underlying proceeding. This requirement was
created to prevent non-litigants from abusing the court system by
conducting burdensome fishing expeditions.9" In certain circumstances,
however, the Federal Rules permit courts to grant limited discovery to
non-litigants. Pursuant to Rule 27, a district court can grant requests for
discovery during the pre-litigation phase of a proceeding.9" In order to
qualify under Rule 27, the requesting party must both verify that he/she
intends to file a complaint" and also prove that there is a significant risk
that the evidence will be lost ifpre-complaint discovery is not permitted.0 "
Even if these requirements are met, the rule only authorizes pre-litigation
discovery in the form of depositions."' It does not allow general
discovery.0 2 Therefore, in essence, general federal discovery tools are only
available to litigants.
Unlike the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the text of § 1782 clearly
authorizes district courts to grant discovery assistance to foreign nonlitigants.0 3 The statute states: "The order may be made.., by a foreign or
international tribunal or upon the application of any interested
person ......
o"Furthermore, § 1782's legislative history confirms the
district court's power to provide discovery assistance to non-litigants.
According to the Senate Report, litigants are simply included among the
interested persons who may invoke section 1782.05 Smit, the key drafter
of the 1964 amendment, similarly endorsed the expansive use of the term
interested person. In his contemporaneous commentary, Smit explained,
"[t]he latter term [interested person] is intended to include not only

96. See FED. R. CIV.P. 26(bX 1).

97. In re Solorio, 192 F.R.D. 709 (D.C.D. UT 2000).
98. See FED. R. CIv. P. 27.

99. Id. The requirement that the requesting party verify that he/she will eventually file a
complaint is arguably another way for courts to ensure that its discovery tools are limited to actual
future litigants.
100. Nevada v. O'Leary, 63 F.3d 932, 936 (9th Cir. 1995).
101.

Id.

102.
103.
104.
105.

See also FED. R. Civ. P. 26 (governing this area).
28 U.S.C. § 1782 (2005) (effective Feb. 10, 1996).
Id. (emphasis added).
See S. REP. No.88-1580 (1964), reprintedin 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3782, 3788.
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litigants before foreign or international tribunals, but also foreign and
international officials as well as any other person whether he be designated
by foreign law or international convention or merely possesses a
reasonable interest in obtaining the assistance."'" Therefore, based on the
face of the statute and its legislative history, it is clear that Congress
intended that § 1782 discovery assistance be available to non-litigants-a
policy that is more expansive than the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
When interpreting whether a foreign non-litigant is an interested person
and thus qualifies for § 1782 aid, it is important that the ruling strikes a
balance between the two conflicting policies. In other words, the decision
should take into account § 1782's broad use of interested person, without
flagrantly violating the Federal Rules' fundamental principle of preventing
unnecessary fishing expeditions. Otherwise, if § 1782 is read to apply to
any interested person, regardless whether the individual has a general or
specific stake in the case, the Court would be opening its doors to a flood
of foreign discovery requests. It is implausible why the Court would be
willing to spend taxpayer dollars on a foreign party's request, when it does
not offer the same general service to its own citizens. Although some
variation is necessary to encourage international comity, such drastic
diverging policies are unexplainable. Therefore, § 1782's interested person
clause should be interpreted in light of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.
This balance can best be achieved if an interested person is defined as
a party who has a legal stake in the matter at hand and who also plays an
actual role in the proceeding. This definition strikes a reasonable balance
for several reasons. The requirement that the applicant has a legal stake in
the proceeding ensures that Congress's intent is expressed while
preventing parties from misusing the federal discovery tools. As
previously mentioned, without such a constraint, federal courts would be
flooded with § 1782 applications from legal scholars and journalists who
have just a general interest in the particular topic, rather than a specific
stake in the case. It is hard to believe that the framers intended to directly
allow such floods of applications.0 7 Thus, by demanding the foreign party
to demonstrate that it has a particular legal stake in the case, a court can
control the number of applications filed.'" This goal is also met by
106. Smit, supra note 45, at 1027.
107. If Congress intended to allow even those remotely interested in the legal topic to file a

§ 1782 request, the statute would not have listed the specific groups that qualify for such assistance.
Cf 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) (2005) (effective Feb. 10, 1996) (stating that a request may be made "by

a foreign or international tribunal or upon the application of any interested person...").
108. The issue of whether an applicant has a legal stake in the foreign proceeding is not a
foreign discoverability issue. An individual's legal stake can be determined by questioning his/her
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requiring the non-litigant to show that it plays an actual role in the
proceeding. This showing proves that the party is not abusing § 1782 by
advancing his, or her, own personal interests, but rather is using the statute
for the benefit of the foreign proceeding.
The proposed definition also allows a court to grant § 1782 assistance
to those foreign parties who could presumably file suit in an American
court, but are unable to bring suit in the foreign court due to particular
nuances in that foreign court's system. For example, any nonparty who has
a specific stake in the outcome of a case should be allowed to file for
§ 1782 assistance. Under these circumstances, despite the foreign party's
non-litigant status, it is still considered, at the very least, an interested
party under the strictest interpretation of the federal rules. Therefore, the
actual purpose of the statute is not lost in a debate of mere logistics.
The interpretation also does not threaten to overthrow prior case law.
As previously mentioned, courts have broadly interpreted the term to
include a variety of applicants such as district attomeys,' °9 foreign
Ministers of Legal Affairs,"° agents for trustees involved in foreign
proceedings,"' and, as of recently due to Intel, a complainant who initiates
an investigation and has the power to appeal the investigating body's
ultimate finding." 12 All these individuals qualify as an interested person
under the proposed definition. They are all parties with a legal stake in the
case at hand.
For example, the agents and district attorney are directly advocating the
legal interests and rights of their clients. Likewise, AMD has a common
interest in seeking protection from Intel's arguably monopolistic practices.
Unlike a scholar, taxpayer, or ordinary citizen, who has just a general
interest in the case, AMD's concern is more genuine and significant. Its
business outlook can drastically change depending on how the EC rules on
the matter. Therefore, AMD, like the other mentioned parties, has a
specific legal interest in the foreign proceeding.
Similarly, the listed parties also play an actual role in the proceeding.
The agents and district attorney are directly advocating their voices as
interested parties, while AMD initiated the complaint and had the authority

general involvement in the case; whereas the issue of discoverability requires a court to specifically
address whether an item is subject to discovery in the foreign court.
109. See, e.g., In re Letters Rogatory from the Tokyo Dist. Prosecutor's Office, 16 F.3d 1016,
1019 (9th Cir. 1994).
110. See, e.g., In re Request for Assistance from Ministry of Legal Affairs ofTrin. & Tobago,
848 F.2d 1151, 1155 (11 th Cir. 1988).
111. See, e.g., Lancaster Factoring Co. v. Mangone, 90 F.3d 38, 42 (2d Cir. 1996).
112. Intel v. AMD, 124 S. Ct. 2466, 2478 (2004).
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to appeal the DG-Competition's decision. These duties clearly show that
the parties' § 1782 request is for use in the foreign proceeding, rather than
solely for advancing personal motives. Therefore, the proposed definition
of interested person clarifies the specific requirements, without drastically
overturning prior case law.
The proposed interpretation also complies with other federal statute's
use of the term interested person. In ordinary federal usage, the phrase,
interested person, does not entirely eliminate non-litigants, nor does it
include any individual with only a general interest in the underlying
proceeding. Rather, these statutes typically rely on a middle ground
definition, such as the one proposed in this Article. For example, 5 U.S.C.
§ 555 (b), the Federal Administrative Procedure Act governing ancillary
matters, defines an interested person as one who "may appear before an
agency or its responsible employees for the presentation, adjustment, or
determination of an issue, request, or controversy in a proceeding.." 113
As this text illustrates, there is no requirement that the interested person be
a party in the proceeding. Likewise, the statute does not include
individuals who only have a general interest in the matter. Rather, in order
to be an interested person under § 555, a party must exhibit a specific
interest, such as the responsibility "for the presentation, adjustment, or
determination of an issue...
An act governing the prohibition of ex parte communications, 5 U.S.C.
§ 557, also relies on the term interested person." 5 Similar to §"
555, § 557
attaches a middle ground definition to the term." 6 The phrase broadly
includes competitors, public officials, and nonprofit or public interest
organizations and associations with a specific interest in the agency matter
being regulated." 7 In other words, the term does not include those
individuals with only a general interest in the agency proceeding-the
same policy driving the proposed § 1782 definition." 8
It is important to note that § 555, § 557, and § 1782 all refer to different
contexts. Sections 555 and 557 both govern agency matters, while § 1782
applies specifically to foreign discovery requests. However, despite this
discrepancy, as the above analysis shows, each statute's use of the term
"interested person" shares a key similarity-a middle ground approach.

113. 5 U.S.C. § 555(b) (2005).
114.
115.
116.
117.
1993).
118.

Id.
5 U.S.C. § 557(d)(1XA) (2005).
Id.; 5 U.S.C. § 555 (2005).
Portland Audubon Soc'y v. Endangered Species Comm., 984 F.2d 1534, 1544 (9th Cir.
Id.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol18/iss1/5

16

Patel: International Judicial Assistance: An Analysis of Intel v. AMD an

2006]INTERNA TFONAL JUDICAL ASSISTANCE: ANAAAL1VS OF INTEL v. AMD AND ISTAFFECT N § 1782

317

This approach does not completely exclude non-litigants nor does it open
the door to any and all persons. Rather, under this middle ground
interpretation, an interested person must exhibit a specific interest in the
underlying matter. Therefore, as § 555 and § 557 illustrate, the proposed
definition is aligned with the general statutory use of the phrase interested
person.
All in all, taking into account prior case law, § 1782's legislative
history, and other statutory uses of the term, the proposed definition strikes

the proper balance between the fundamental principles of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure and § 1782's expansive text. This interpretation
assures compliance with the actual text of § 1782 while not overriding the
legislature's general intent, as shown in its legislative history and through
other statutory uses of the term interested person.

I1.No FOREIGN DIscovERABILITY REQUIREMENT

Prior to Intel, courts were split on whether § 1782 contained a threshold
requirement that evidence sought to be discovered under § 1782 must also
be discoverable under the laws of the foreign jurisdiction. 19 The U.S.
Court of Appeals for the First and Eleventh Circuits imposed this
discoverability requirement on all applicants.' On the opposite extreme,
the Second, Third, and Ninth Circuits refused to enforce any form of a
discoverability requirement.'12 The Fourth and-Fifth Circuits took the
middle ground approach, as they enforced the requirement on all parties
except foreign sovereigns.
The U.S. Supreme Court resolved this disagreement in Intel by ruling
that § 1782 does not contain any foreign-discoverability requirement. " In
other words, § 1782 does not bar a district court from ordering the
production of documents, even though the documents are not discoverable
in the foreign jurisdiction. 23 Similarly, the Court also ruled that an
applicant is not required to prove that U.S. law would allow discovery in

119. Metis, supranote 16, at 336.
120. Newman & Zaslowsky, supra note 3, at 3.
121. Id.
122. Intel v. AMD, 124 S. Ct. 2466, 2481 (2004).
123. The requesting party is not required to first try to obtain evidence through the foreign
tribunal before invoking § 1782 rights. W. Cameron Beard, ForeignPartiesInvoke U.S. Law to
Seek Evidence, 21 NAT'L L.J. 26 (1999).
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a domestic litigation analogous to the actual litigation taking place in the
foreign tribunal. 24
The Court's reasoning was direct: neither the plain text of the statute
or its legislative history suggested that Congress intended to impose such
a blanket restriction.2" If Congress wanted to enforce this significant
limitation, the Court stated, it would have clearly expressed its desires in
the statutory text. 26 The Court also rejected Intel's comity argument,
finding that foreign tribunals would not be offended by district courts
ordering the production of discovery that would otherwise be
undiscoverable under the rules of that foreign country.'27 For these reasons,
the U.S. Supreme Court refused to impose a foreign discoverability
requirement on § 1782 applications."12
The Court issued the wrong ruling. It should not have completely
eliminated a foreign discoverability requirement on all § 1782 requests.
Contrary to the Court's opinion, such a ban will produce the opposite
result than what § 1782 was created to achieve. By enacting § 1782,
Congress intended to assist foreign parties and tribunals by bringing "the
United States to the forefront of nations adjusting their procedures to those
of sister nations.. ." with the overall goal of encouraging foreign countries
similarly to adjust their procedures. 2 9 The complete elimination of the
foreign discoverability requirement, however, does not help achieve either
of these goals. It does not improve the assistance to foreign parties and
proceedings, nor does it better encourage foreign countries to apply similar
liberal discovery policies. Rather, to best promote these aims, the Court
should enforce a mandatory foreign discoverability requirement on all
requesting parties, except foreign tribunals.
The text of the statute does not explicitly impose different
discoverability requirements on foreign litigants, interested parties, or
foreign tribunals. However, as both the Fourth and Fifth Circuits
emphasize, different policies are necessary to achieve § 1782's goal of
improving international comity. 3 ' Requests by foreign litigants and

124. Intel, 124 S. Ct. at 2482.
125. Id. at 2481.
126. Id.

127. Id.
128. Id. at 2482. However, applicants have had a better chance in getting their requests
approved when the documents were discoverable in the foreign jurisdiction. Don Zupanec,
Discoveryfor Use in Foreign Proceeding: Discoverability in Foreign Jurisdiction, 19 FED.
LITIGATOR 11 (2004).
129. S. REP. No. 88-1580 (1964), reprintedin 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3783.
130. See In re Letter of Request from Amtsgericht Ingolstadt, 82 F.3d 590 (4th Cir. 1996); In
re Letter Rogatory from First Court, Caracas, 42 F.3d 308 (5th Cir. 1995). These cases advocate
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interested parties must be examined under the foreign tribunal's laws in
order to prevent an applicant from circumventing the forum nation's rules

by diverting a discovery request to an American court. 3 ' In other words,
a discoverability requirement is needed out of fear of offending the foreign
forum nation. Similar concerns are not implicated when a foreign court
requests § 1782 assistance. After all, the foreign court is presumably the
3
more informed authority of what is discoverable under its own laws. 1
"For an American court to double-check the foreign court's request would
[trigger] exactly the kind of [results] that § 1782 seeks to avoid."' 33 For
these reasons, a discoverability requirement should be imposed on foreign
litigants and interested parties, but not on foreign courts.
Although the district court can encompass these policies in the
discretionary portion of its application evaluation, these guidelines should
be mandatory in order to ensure that § 1782's main goals are achieved.
Otherwise, some judges could deviate from these rules. In order to clearly
explain why this modified approach would better advance § 1782's
objectives, the analysis will be broken up into two parts: (1) why a
threshold foreign discoverability rule should be enforced on foreign
litigants and interested parties; and (2) why foreign tribunals should be
exempt from such a restriction.
A. ForeignLitigants andInterestedParties

A threshold foreign discoverability requirement on all foreign litigants
and interested parties will advance both of § 1782's principal objectives.
First, it will increase international comity by providing foreign tribunals
with only useful and wanted evidence. By tailoring § 1782 requests to
comply with the foreign state's laws, American courts would be sending
the message that they respect and thus seek to abide by the foreign
tribunal's discovery rules. The lack of a discoverability requirement,
however, would not produce the same results. Simply ordering discovery
without analyzing the foreign discovery laws will not show that the United
States is respecting the other nation's judicial system. The district court,
after all, is not making the effort to even glance at the sister nation's rules.
In fact, without a discoverability rule, there is a risk that American courts
for a discoverability requirement on foreign litigants and interested parties, but not on foreign
courts. Both courts solely base their arguments on advancing § 1782's twin aims of providing
efficient means of assistance to participants in international litigation and encouraging foreign
countries by example to provide similar means ofassistance to American courts. Id. at 592.
131. See generallyIngolstadt, 82 F.3d at 590; Caracas,42 F.3d at 308.
132. Caracas,42 F.3d at 311.
133. Id.
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will actually generate animosity in the legal community, especially if the

district court grants a party access to evidence that would otherwise be
undiscoverable under the foreign state's laws. In such a case, rather than

accommodating the actual discovery needs of the sister nation, the district
court's decision will setup "a collision course with foreign tribunals and

legislatures, which have carefully chosen the procedures and laws best
suited for their concepts of litigation."' 34 By granting discovery where the
foreign rules specifically forbid it, American courts will show a blatant
disregard for the sovereign's decision on how to enforce and how not to
enforce its laws.135 This scenario can be avoided if a foreign
discoverability requirement is enforced on foreign litigants and interested
parties. At the time a § 1782 request is made, the requesting party should

be required to present proof that the evidence is likely to be discoverable
in the foreign jurisdiction. If the requesting party does not meet this
relatively relaxed standard, then the application should be rejected.

However, in Intel, the Court rejected such a blanket restriction because
it would prevent discovery of materials that are forbidden in the sister
36

nation for reasons peculiar to its legal practice but not the U.S. practice.
In other words, the foreign nation may limit discovery for reasons that do
not necessarily signal objection to aid from U.S. courts.'37 For example, a
foreign tribunal may refuse to grant depositions because it is a very costly
procedure. However, if the tribunal were presented with such evidence
from an outside source, such as an America court, it may potentially utilize
the evidence in making its final decision. Therefore, in scenarios like
these, the Court argued, application of a foreign-discoverability rule serves
no purpose.'38 Rather, the rule only frustrates § 1782's
goal of assisting
39
foreign tribunals in obtaining relevant information.
Although the Court's argument has merit, its importance is overstated.
After all, these concerns can be addressed in the discretionary portion of
the district court's analysis as an exception to the discoverability rule. For
example, such an exception could be stated in the following manner: a
district court can grant a § 1782 request for evidence that is otherwise
undiscoverable in the foreign nation, if the requesting party can prove that
the evidence will be reviewed in the foreign proceeding. This exception

134. In re Asta Medica, 981 F.2d 1,6 (lst Cir. 1992).
135. See In re Order for Judicial Assistance in a Foreign Proceeding, 147 F.R.D. 223, 225
(C.D. Cal. 1993).
136. Intel v. AMD, 124 S. Ct. 2466, 2481 (2004).
137. See id.
138. Id. at 2481-82.
139. Id. at 2482.
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addresses the Court's concern without completely prohibiting the
discoverability requirement and the above-mentioned benefits that go
along with such a rule. Furthermore, this approach's benefits heavily
outweigh its costs. With little effort, the requesting party can seek a
foreign court official's permission, via an affidavit or other court
authorized document, to seek discovery. This proof would meet the
exception's relaxed standards. In exchange for this small effort, district
courts can ensure that they are still advancing § 1782's chief goal of
international comity. Demanding the requesting party to prove that the
foreign court authorizes the use of the contested discovery is in itself a
sign that the district court respects the other nation's discovery rules.
Likewise, a foreign court's refusal to grant written permission can be
interpreted as a signal that it does not place a high value on the requested
evidence. Therefore, rejecting the applicant's § 1782 request in this
scenario is also consistent with promoting international comity.
Enforcing a discoverability requirement, with the above-mentioned
exception, will also promote § 1782's second main objective: to
effectively assist foreign parties and proceedings." 4 The discoverability
requirement only permits the district court to order discovery in
accordance with the foreign court's rules, while the exception permits the
discovery of evidence that, although forbidden by the foreign nation for
reasons peculiar to its legal practice, the foreign court grants special
permission for the district court to produce. Thus, this comprehensive
policy only allows the production of useful evidence--evidence that the
foreign court will consider in its adjudication. The requirement filters out
any evidence that the foreign court cannot use in its judicial process.
Section 1782, therefore, is more helpful to foreign tribunals if a
discoverability requirement is enforced. Rather than wasting time sorting
through pages of undiscoverable documents, as is the case in a forum
without a discoverability4 requirement, foreign tribunals will now only
receive useful evidence.' 1

140. In re Schmitz, 259 F. Supp. 2d 294, 299 (S.D.N.Y 2003).
141. Intel v. AMD, 124 S. Ct. 2466,2481 (2004).
We question whether foreign governments would in fact be offended by a
domestic prescription permitting, but not requiring, judicial assistance. A foreign
nation may limit discovery within its domain for reasons peculiar to its own legal
practices, culture, or traditions-reasons that do not necessarily signal objection
to aid from the United States federal courts.
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A foreign discoverability rule also promotes efficiency. 42 Under the
Court's current approach, district courts can grant a broad discovery
request, leaving it to the foreign court to decide whether the evidentiary
rules are satisfied.143 This policy, however, makes little economic sense
considering the great cost savings to the subjected party by preventing the
production of undiscoverable evidence at its earliest stages.'" In other
words, it is irrational to allow an overly broad discovery order when it is
possible to trim or reject the request at the onset, and thereby save
considerable time and money. Furthermore, parties are naturally less likely
to submit requests that have no chance of satisfying the foreign
discoverability rule. The reduction in frivolous requests will decrease the
time, energy and tax dollars that American courts will spend on
adjudicating § 1782 applications.
The rule's benefits are even more attractive considering the relatively
easy methods available to determine the foreign discoverability of
evidence. For example, the district court could base its determination on
expert testimony on the foreign nation's litigation process. The
requirement could also be satisfied if the requesting party presented a court
authorized document attesting that the evidence is likely to be discoverable
in the foreign tribunal. Either way, district courts can attain significant
savings by enforcing a discoverability rule that poises only minor
consequential costs.
The Court's decision to entirely eliminate a foreign discoverability
requirement could create advantages for some parties while unfairly
disadvantaging others. Justice Breyer emphasizes the significance of this
problem in his dissenting opinion.'45 More specifically, the Court's
decision to eliminate a discoverability rule could severely disadvantage
American companies involved in disputes with foreign companies who do
not do substantial business in the United States." * If the district court
decides to exercise its broad discretion and grant liberal discovery

142. I made a logical conclusion here. If there is no discoverability requirement, then the
foreign tribunal will be presented with a broad scope of evidence-which may include inadmissible
evidence. Thus, the foreign court will have to spend time deciding which part of the evidence is
discoverable/admissible and which part is undiscoverableinadmissible. On the other hand, if the
American court imposes a discoverability requirement, then the foreign tribunal will only get
discoverable evidence. Hence, it would not have to go through the additional analysis as in the first
example.
143. Intel, 124 S. Ct. at2481.
144. Reply Brief for Petitioner at 19; Intel, 124 S. Ct. at 2466.
145. See Intel, 124 S. Ct. at 2485.
146. Brief of Amici Curiae Nat'l Ass'n of Mfrs. at 7, Intel, 124 S. Ct. 2466 (No. 02-572),
availableat 2002 WL 32157392.
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assistance, foreign companies may be able to obtain discovery from both
the U.S. firm and related third parties who are situated in the district
court's jurisdiction. In other words, "[a]ll the foreign party need do is file
a request for assistance under section 1782 and the floodgates are open for
unlimited discovery."14 7 The U.S. firm, on the other hand, will only be able
to secure the limited discovery available under the foreign court's
jurisdiction. Therefore, applying § 1782 without a discoverability
requirement could create serious inequities between foreign and American
companies.
Enforcing a foreign discoverability rule is the best way to eliminate this
inequality. This requirement will prevent foreign parties from invoking
§ 1782 to evade the foreign nation's strict discovery rules in hopes of
seeking broad U.S. discovery."' Therefore, regardless of whether the
foreign company files in the United States or its forum nation, both the
foreign and U.S. companies will be subject to the same discovery rules.
The Court's decision could also create unwanted loopholes where both
parties have substantial contacts in the United States. For example, assume
that Company A conducts business in the United States and in Japan,
while Company B only conducts business in the United States. Under the
Intel opinion, Company B could possibly invoke a proceeding against
Company A in Japan and then file a § 1782 application for discovery. In
other words, Company B could obtain broad discovery without having to
undertake the considerable burdens of filing a lawsuit in the United States.
Company A, on the other hand, may not be able to sue Company B in
Japan because Company B may be beyond Japan's jurisdiction.
Like the first example, a foreign discoverability rule may be the best
way to prevent this loophole. Under such a rule, Company B would be
forced to either file a suit in Japan and work under Japan's discovery rules
or, if it desired broader discovery rights, initiate the more burdensome
lawsuit in the United States.'49 In other words, whichever forum the
plaintiff chose, both parties would have access to the same discovery tools.
As these two examples show, the remarkably broad Intel opinion exposes
U.S. companies to dangerous discovery practices simply because the
parties operate in foreign markets. Therefore, in order to equalize the
playing field, § 1782 should contain a foreign discoverability requirement.

147. In re AstaMedica, 981 F.2d 1, 5 (lst Cir. 1992).
148. In re Letter Rogatory from the First Court of First Instance in Civil Matters, 42 F.3d 308,
310 (5th Cir. 1995).
149. See generally Brief of the Nat'l Ass'n of Mfrs. Intel, 124 S. Ct. 2466 (No. 02-572),
availableat 2002 WL 32157392.
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B. Foreign Tribunals
Foreign tribunals should not be subject to a discoverability
requirement. Unlike the justifications for foreign litigants and interested
parties, § 1782's main objectives are better served without imposing such
a rule on tribunals. For instance, in the case of a private applicant, a
discoverability determination prevents the applicant from circumventing
the foreign state's discovery rules. It ensures that the applicant's request
is limited only to evidence that is discoverable in the forum state. Thus, by
only ordering discovery that abides by the foreign nation's discovery rules,
district courts promote international comity. The similar comity argument
is not present in the case where the applicant is a foreign tribunal, because
the tribunal is presumably an expert in its discovery rules. 5 ' In other
words, the foreign tribunal is the best interpreter of its own nation's laws.
It is this quality that makes it unnecessary to apply a discoverability rule
on a sovereign's § 1782 request. Imposing such a requirement would foster
animosity, because the district court would essentially be second-guessing
the tribunal on the interpretation of its own laws. Such a scenario is
especially damaging considering that § 1782 was specifically designed to
foster relationships with foreign countries in order to encourage them to
grant reciprocal discovery assistance to the United States in the future.
Section 1782's second main objective, to assist foreign parties and
proceedings, is also better achieved without a discoverability requirement
on sovereign applicants. Because the tribunal is an expert on its country's
evidentiary laws and also the author of the § 1782 application, it is nearly
certain that all the evidence requested will be used in the foreign action.
Therefore, in order to promote international comity and assist foreign
parties and proceedings, it is in the statute's interest not to have a
discoverability requirement on a foreign tribunal's § 1782 application.
A similar rationale has also been applied to a sovereign's discovery
request pursuant to Treaties on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal
Matters (MLAT). For example, the Eleventh Circuit held that government
MLAT discovery requests are subject only to the restrictions set forth in
the MLAT itself.' In other words, the MLAT is not subject to a
discoverability requirement. Because both MLAT and § 1782 applications
are requests for discovery assistance, the Eleventh Circuit's ruling
strengthens the argument against enforcing a discoverability requirement
on a tribunal's § 1782 discovery application.

150. Letter Rogatoryfrom the First Court ofFirst Instance in Civil Matters, 42 F.3d at 310.
151. In re Commissioner's Subpoenas, 325 F.3d 1287, 1304 (11th Cir. 2003).
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C. PreservationofAll Legally Applicable Privileges
Although the Court held that § 1782 did not contain a discoverability
requirement, the Court specifically emphasized that § 1782 orders cannot
demand production of evidence in violation of any legally applicable
privilege. 52 This restriction recognizes all privileges to which the
subjected party may be entitled under appropriate conflict of law rules.
Therefore, whenever a privilege is asserted under § 1782, a court must
determine whether there is a relevant
5 3 American or foreign privilege
evidence.
of
production
the
precluding
The Court's stance on enforcing all applicable American and foreign
privileges clashes with its policy against applying a foreign or domestic
discovery requirement. The Court's ruling, however, is correct for two
reasons. First, subsection (a) of § 1782 confirms Congress's intent to
preserve privilege law: "[a] person may not be compelled to give his
testimony or statement or to produce a document or other thing in violation
of any legally applicable privilege."'" Although this text does not
explicitly acknowledge the inclusion of both American and foreign
privileges, the Senate Report provides the needed clarity by stating:
"[Section 1782] provides for the recognition of all privileges to which the
55
person may be entitled, including privileges recognized by foreign law."'1
Second, privileges were granted broad protection under § 1782 to preserve
specific freedoms. More specifically, subsection (b) explicitly reaffirms
the pre-existing rights of persons within the United States to voluntarily
56
give evidence in connection with foreign or international proceedings.
By explicitly protecting privileges, Congress intentionally took away the
district court's discretion to override these rights. This protection also
stressed to foreign countries the large degree of freedom existing in this
area in the United States. 15 7 For these reasons, the Court was correct in
emphasizing that privileges were exempt from the non-discoverability
rule.

152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

Intel, 124 S. Ct. at 2480.
Smit, supranote 22, at 17-18.
28 U.S.C. § 1782 (2005) (effective Feb. 10, 1996).
S. REP. No. 88-1580 (1964), reprintedin 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3782, 3790.
Id.

157. Id.
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IV. THE DISTRICT COURT'S DISCRETION TO GRANT
DISCOVERY ASSISTANCE

The district court is not required to order discovery merely because an
applicant satisfies § 1782's three statutory requirements. Rather, satisfying
the requirements only grants the district court authority to order such
discovery.' 58 According to Intel, the court enjoys a wide degree of freedom
in deciding whether or not to grant a § 1782 request. In fact, its order may
only be overturned for abuse of discretion.' 59
Although neither the legislature nor the judiciary has defined a specific
set of guidelines for the district court to follow, the U.S. Supreme Court
in Intel mentioned a few factors that a district court may consider in
exercising its discretionary authority. The Court emphasized that the
directions were only suggestions. In other words, provided that the three
statutory requirements are met, the district court holds full discretion in
framing its analysis on whether to grant an applicant's request for
discovery assistance.
The first factor the Court highlighted was whether the person from
1
whom discovery is sought is a participant in the foreign proceeding. 60
When evidence is sought from a participant, the foreign or international
tribunal can exercise its own jurisdictional powers to compel the
participant to produce evidence. In contrast, nonparticipants generally lack
access to the foreign tribunal's discovery powers. In such cases, a § 1782
request may be the applicant's last hope to obtain the desired evidence.
Therefore, a district court should be more likely to compel discovery from
may be harder to obtain
a nonparticipant, because the requested evidence
6
or even unobtainable absent § 1782 aid.' '
The U.S. Supreme Court also recommended that district courts
scrutinize the scope of the request. 162 If the request is overly intrusive or
burdensome, the district court should consider trimming it. This function,
rampant "fishing expeditions" and other such
the Court stated, will prevent
63
abuses of the statute. 1

158. Intel, 124 S. Ct. at 2482.
159. United Kingdom v. United States, 238 F.3d 1312, 1319 (1 th Cir. 2001).
160. Intel v. AMD, 124 S. Ct. 2466, 2483 (2004).
161. Newman & Zaslowsky, supra note 3, at 3.
162. Intel, 124 S. Ct. at 2483.
163. Id. at 2484. The Court seems to have made this suggestion to prevent abuse of§ 1782
rather than to encourage the use of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as a guiding factor in
deciding § 1782 requests. This observation seems accurate because the Court made no reference
to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in any other portion of the opinion. See generally id.
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District courts reviewing a § 1782 request should also take into account
"the nature of the foreign tribunal, the character of the [foreign]
proceedings underway abroad, and the receptivity of the foreign
government or court or agency abroad to U.S. federal-court judicial
assistance." ' In other words, the court's decision should promote
§ 1782's goal of encouraging similar discovery assistance from other
foreign countries. 65 In order to foster such international comity, district
courts should reject discovery applications that harm or insult foreign
tribunals. For example, district courts are encouraged to filter out requests
that intentionally circumvent a foreign nation's evidentiary rules.'6
Similarly, if the request offends the foreign country for other material
67
reasons, the court should deny the application based on comity reasons.
The court also has authority to reject requests by foreign parties who are
prohibited from obtaining the evidence in their foreign tribunals.
Therefore, as these factors emphasize, when making a decision to grant
discovery, district courts should make certain that the goal of international
comity is not compromised.
If the district court ultimately decides to grant discovery assistance, it
must issue an order directing that the appropriate evidence be obtained.6 8

A court has a wide latitude in constructing this order. It can mandate that
the rules governing the procedure for gathering the evidence be either the
rules of the foreign litigation, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or any
combination thereof." 9 In short, the court has complete discretion to
determine whether to grant a discovery order, as well as the appropriate
manner in which to obtain the requested evidence. 7 '
V. THE DISTRICT COURT'S DECISION ON REMAND
The U.S. Supreme Court determined that AMD's discovery request met
all three of § 1782's statutory requirements. Because the threshold
requirements were satisfied, the Court stated that it was now in the district
court's discretion whether to grant AMD's discovery request. After
suggesting a few factors to guide the lower court's discretional authority,

164. Id.
at 2483.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

See generally Bernard & Pickholz, supra note 17.
Intel, 124 S. Ct. at 2483.
Schmitz v. Bernstein Liebhard & Lifshitz, 376 F.3d 79, 84 (2d Cir. 2004).
Bernard & Pickholz, supra note 17, at 482.
Id.
Id.
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the U.S. Supreme Court remanded the case to the Northern District of
California.
The district court issued its decision on remand in October 2004.
AMD's discovery request was rejected in its entirety. 7' In reaching this
decision, Judge James Ware relied exclusively on the four discretionary
factors mentioned in the U.S. Supreme Court's opinion. First, Judge Ware
noted that Intel, the party from whom discovery was being sought, was a
participant in the foreign proceeding. 2 As the U.S. Supreme Court
emphasized and Judge Ware reiterated, in such a case, the need for § 1782
assistance was generally not compelling. Because the foreign court has
jurisdiction over Intel, it could have independently ordered Intel to
produce evidence if such documents were deemed necessary.173 Second,
the EC was clearly opposed to judicial assistance in this case. 4 The EC
filed two amicus curiae briefs in which it specifically explained why it did
not want or need § 1782 aid. " For example, it stated that such assistance
would jeopardize "vital Commission interests."' 76 Furthermore, even if
such a request was granted, the EC did not consider it necessary to request
or even subsequently review the documents sought. " Third, in Judge
Ware's opinion, AMD's application was an attempt to circumvent the
EC's decision not to permit such discovery.' Fourth, AMD's request was
unduly intrusive and burdensome. AMD failed to make any attempts to
tailor its application to the matter in controversy.7 9 Therefore, collectively
based on these four grounds, Judge Ware denied AMD's § 1782 request
in its entirety.
The district court's opinion should help curb some fears of § 1782
being used as a tool to circumvent foreign evidentiary rules. Although
Judge Ware repeatedly stressed his discretionary power in rejecting the
§ 1782 request, his opinion concentrated solely on the four factors
mentioned in the U.S. Supreme Court's opinion. 8 ' Hence, ifJudge Ware's
decision is any indication of the district courts' reliance on the U.S.
Supreme Court's discretionary factors, applicants should have some sense
171. AMD v. Intel, 2004 WL 2282320, at *3 (N.D. Cal. 2004).
172. Id. at "2.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. See BriefofAmici Curiae Comm'n of the European Cmtys., at 11-16, Intel v. AMD, 124
S.Ct. 2466 (2003) (No. 02-572), available at 2003 WL 23138389.
177. Id.
178. AMD, 2004 WL 2282320, at *3.
179. Id.
180. Id. at *2-3.
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of how to gauge the success of their § 1782 requests. The U.S. Supreme
Court's four-factor test is devised to filter out unduly burdensome
requests, as well as those applications that circumvent the foreign
tribunal's evidentiary rules. As the district court illustrated in Intel, a
broadly drafted request, which exceeds the scope of the foreign
proceeding, will almost certainly be denied. Therefore, at the very least,
applicants should understand that § 1782 is not a free-for-all method of
acquiring a company's documents simply because the company is
involved in a foreign proceeding.
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